They might be called the deductivist, the positivist or Popperian, the predictionist, and the eclectic. Or to assign representative or striking figures to positions, these are John Stuart Mill's, Mark Blaug's, Milton Friedman's, and Donald McCloskey's views. I shall sketch and assess each position and defend aspects of the deductivist and eclectic views. Along the way I shall have something to say not only about how to do economics, but also about how to philosophize about economic methodology.
Deductivism
John Stuart Mill was both a Ricardian economist and a staunch empiricist, yet his economics seems not to measure up to empiricist standards for knowledge. After all, the implications of Ricardian economics appeared to be disconfirmed (de Marchi, 1970) ; for example, the share of national income paid as rent did not increase. How could Mill reconcile his confidence in Ricardian economics and his empiricism? In Mill's view (1836, 1843, bk. 6), a complex subject matter like political economy can only be studied scientifically by means of the deductive method. Since so many causal factors influence economic phenomena, and experimentation is generally not possible, there is no way to employ the methods of induction directly. The only solution is first inductively to establish basic psychological or technical laws-such as "people seek more wealth," or the law of diminishing returns-and then to deduce their economic implications given specifications of relevant circumstances. Empirical confirmation or verification has an important role in determining whether the deductively derived conclusions are applicable, in checking the correctness of the deductions and in determining whether significant causal factors have been left out, but such testing does not bear on one's commitment to the basic " laws." They have already been established by introspection or experimentation. Political economy is in this regard similar to the science of tides, which applies independently established laws.
Mill believed that these established premises state accurately how specific causal factors operate. They are obviously not universal laws; for example, everyone does not always seek more wealth. These basic generalizations are instead statements of tendencies. Since these tendencies are subject to various "disturbances" or "interfering causes," which cannot all be specified in advance, vague ceteris paribus (other things being equal) clauses that allow for these disturbances will be unavoidable in formulating them. Economics explores the consequences of these established, but inexact, premises. Since much is left out of the theory, these consequences will not always obtain.
In Mill's view economics is a science, for economists do know the basic causes of economic phenomena. But it is an inexact science, for there are myriad interferences or disturbing causes. Mill's views are almost the opposite of Milton Friedman's, for Mill holds that the confidence of economists in the science of political economy is based on direct and rather casual confirmation of its assumptions, not on serious tests of their implications. Not only were Mill's views adopted by followers such as Cairnes (1888) and early neoclassical methodologists such as John Neville Keynes (1890), but if one updates the language and the economic theory, one has the view to which, I suggest, most orthodox economists (regardless of what they may say in methodological discussion) still subscribe (see also Stewart, 1979) .
The transition from classical to neoclassical economics brought not only changes in economic theory, but methodological changes as well, for neoclassical theory focuses much more on individual preferences and decision making than did classical economics. Despite this difference, which was much emphasized by authors such as Frank Knight (1935 Knight ( , 1940 The propositions of economic theory, like all scientific theory, are obviously deductions from a series of postulates. ... The main postulate of the theory of value is the fact that individuals can arrange their preferences in an order, and in fact do so. The main postulate of the theory of production is the fact that there are [sic] more than one factor of production. The main postulate of the theory of dynamics is the fact that we are not certain regarding future scarcities. These are not postulates the existence of whose counterpart in reality admits of extensive dispute once their nature is fully realised. We do not need controlled experiments to establish their validity: they are so much the stuff of our everyday experience that they have only to be stated to be recognized as obvious.
Although Robbins overstates his case, I think that he is basically right.
Positivist or Popperian Views
To anyone familiar with the methodological literature of the last half-century, such a complacent view of the deductive method must seem perverse. For the theme which has dominated this period is that claims that are hedged with qualifications and ceteris paribus clauses are untestable and uninformative. What Mill or Robbins called "tendencies" or "inexact laws" are qualified claims such as, "In the absence of disturbances or interferences, people prefer more wealth," or "Ceteris paribus, returns to variable inputs will diminish." Since the content of the ceteris paribus clause is not fully specified, it seems that these statements are unfalsifiable and lack definite empirical Although some, such as Knight and the Austrians, were prepared to deny that the standards of the natural sciences apply to economics, most tried to show that economics satisfies all reasonable demands that one may make of a science. Fritz Machlup's essays (1955, 1960) give some idea of such attempts. Machlup argues that microeconomic theory is compatible with later and more sophisticated logical positivist (or "logical empiricist") accounts of the nature of science, which considerably loosen the connection that is required between theory and observation. Machlup argues that both instrumentalists and defenders of "partial interpretation" views recognize that one need not be concerned about the truth of a theoretical claim such as profit maximization. But the philosophers who defended instrumentalism and " partial interpretation" views were concerned to show how theories that make claims about unobservable entities and properties and thus cannot be directly empirically tested might nevertheless be meaningful and indirectly testable. They never suggested that one should ignore the falsity of a claim-such as "all firms attempt to maximize profits"-on the grounds that such a claim is "theoretical."
Predictionism
The most influential way of reconciling economics and up-to-date philosophy of science was, however, not Machlup's, but Milton Friedman's. In his famous essay, "The Methodology of Positive Economics" (1953), Friedman offered the apparent 2Given positivist or Popperian standards, the answer is "no." But no science meets these unreasonable standards. In contrast to Samuelson (1963) In Friedman's usage, any implication of a theory whose truth is not yet known counts as a prediction of a theory, even if it is not concerned with the future. Since the goals of science are exclusively predictive, a theory which enables one to make reliable predictions is a good theory. In case of a tie on the criterion of predictive success, simpler theories or theories of wider scope (that apply to a wider range of phenomena) are to be preferred (p. 10).
Friedman stresses that there is no other test of a theory in terms of whether its "assumptions" are "unrealistic" (p. 14). When Friedman speaks of the "assumptions" of a theory, he includes both fundamental assertions (such as the claim that consumers are utility maximizers) and additional premises needed in particular applications (for example, the claim that different brands of cigarettes are perfect substitutes for one another). Although Friedman equivocates with the term "unrealistic," usually he means (as he must if he is to respond to Lester's challenge) that an assumption is unrealistic if it is not true, perhaps not even approximately true, of the phenomena to which the theory is applied.
Friedman can then argue that researchers such as Lester mistakenly attempt to assess the "assumptions" of neoclassical theory instead of its predictions. In dismissing any assessment of assumptions, Friedman is also responding to a critical tradition which extends back to the German Historical School via American Institutionalists, such as Veblen. This critical tradition questions the worth of abstract theorizing and objects to the purportedly unreasonably unrealistic assumptions of neoclassical theory. Friedman apparently enables one to reject all such criticism as fundamentally confused.
But Lester's case cannot be dismissed so easily, for Lester apparently showed that neoclassical theory makes false predictions concerning, for instance, the results of his surveys. The distinction between assumptions and implications is, indeed, a shallow one that rests on nothing but the particular formulation of a theory. Assumptions trivially imply themselves, and theories can be reformulated with different sets of assumptions that have the same implications. Unrealistic assumptions (in the sense of false assumptions) will always result in false predictions, except, perhaps, in the case of assumptions concerning unobservables.
Friedman notices the problem (pp. 26-7) and responds to it by insisting that all that matters is how well a theory predicts the phenomena in which economists are (at least on the particular occasion) interested (pp. 20, 27-28). This odd instrumentalism suggests that falsity of assumptions or of predictions is unimportant unless it detracts from a theory's performance in predicting the phenomena in which one is interested. A theory of the distribution of leaves on trees that states that it is as if leaves had the ability to move instantaneously from branch to branch is thus regarded by Friedman as perfectly "plausible" (p. 20), although of narrower scope than accepted theory. If a theory predicts accurately what one wants to know, it is a good theory, otherwise it is not. 
When Friedman says that it is as if leaves move or as if expert billiard players solve complicated equations (p. 21), he means that attributing movement to leaves or calculating power to billiard players leads to correct predictions concerning the phenomena in which one is interested. And a theory which accomplishes this is a good theory, for a " theory is to be judged by its predictive power for the class of phenomena which it is intended to explain" (p. 8). Friedman is not just saying that if a theory "works," then one should use it, but that all one wants of science are theories that work for particular purposes. The realism of the assumptions of microeconomics or the truth of its uninteresting or irrelevant implications is unimportant, except

Eclecticism
Many have by now recognized that there are few good philosophical authorities on matters of theory assessment. Although there is still a great deal to be learned from the judicious study of contemporary philosophy of science, those interested in economic methodology must use their own judgment and their knowledge of the practice of economists to formulate and to defend rational standards for the practice of economics. The situation of a methodologist concerned about understanding and improving economic practice is similar to that of an economist concerned with understanding and improving business practice. Although both may find some of the practices they study mistaken or irrational, both had better show some sense and caution in applying general theories and had better understand thoroughly the actual problems and procedures of the object they study.
Attempts to carry out such a delicate task have varied. Alexander Rosenberg's Microeconomic Laws: A Philosophical Analysis (1976) is something of a watershed. In the 0bjections that readers have voiced to these examples instructively support my point. One objected that neoclassical theory obviously allows for "shocks." But, unless it does so by means of a not-fully-specified ceteris paribus clause, there will still be refutations of the kind cited. And if not-fully-specified ceteris paribus clauses are permitted, the "repeated failure of its implications to be contradicted" is a cheap triumph. Another reader objected that better examples are those in which the assumptions involved in the particular application of the theory are satisfied. I agree, but this is certainly not a line that Friedman or others who rest everything on the success of predictions can follow. For we are not supposed to pay any attention to whether the assumptions are satisfied-that is, to whether the assumptions are "realistic" for the situation at hand. There are examples in which predictive failures are more puzzling and disturbing than in the cases cited in the text. Consider the fact that even in inflationary circumstances many firms evaluate their inventories on a first in, first out basis or the fact that shares in closed-end mutual funds sometimes sell for less than the value of the assets of the funds (Stiglitz, 1982) . decade since publishing this book Rosenberg's own views have shifted drastically; he denied at one point (1983) that economics is an empirical science at all. But in publishing his first book, and especially in his discussion there of particular aspects of economics, such as the relations between micro-and macroeconomics or the sense in which explanations in economics involve both reasons and causes (chapter 5), Rosenberg is responsible for a growing literature on economic methodology by philosophers of science. This literature is distinctive in its attention to the details of methodological practice and in its cautious use of philosophical models of science.
Among economists the best-known authors in this more eclectic and empirical vein are probably Bruce Caldwell ( Not surprisingly, I think that the best way forward concerning both theory appraisal and economic methodology more generally is the fourth (eclectic) way, the path I have taken: to focus on the methodology economists practice, making use of whatever tools philosophers of science have had to offer that appear to be well-made and apt for the job (Hausman, 1981a, ch. 12) . Although methodologists may find much to criticize, they had better begin by understanding as thoroughly as they can how economists go about their business and why they do what they do. The Popperian/positivist and predictionist interludes in economic methodology have been largely unenlightening. With some restatement and toning down of the overly optimistic conviction that economics starts with the central truths concerning its domain, I think that Mill's views still stand.
The most promising and interesting methodological issues to tackle now are not directly concerned with theory appraisal. The role and significance of general equilibrium theory are still not entirely clear. The implications of rational expectations for the objectivity and logic of economics remain to be explored. The notion of rationality in strategic and uncertain circumstances presents difficult open questions. In tackling problems such as these, I look forward to profitable collaboration between economists and philosophers. * Many of the details in this paper are drawn from earlier works, like Hausman (1984 Hausman ( , 1986 . For a more extensive exposition and references, see Hausman (1988b 
